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Health and Stress During International Crisis: 
Neglected Input Variables in the Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making Process°' 
THOMAS C. WIEGELE 
Northern Illinois University 
Many variables influence the behavior of political leaders in deci-
sion-making situations. In the foreign policy realm, Snyder, Bruck, and 
Sapi.n, Paige , and Allison among others have provided some reasonably 
clear conceptual frameworks to aid in the sorting out of variables.1 In 
each one of these differing perspectives, however, very little was done 
to examine the individuals themselves who are part of the policy mak-
ing process . Instead, emphasis has been on the concepts of rationality, 
organization , routine, process, standard operating procedures , and na-
tional interests and goals. 
What has been lacking in foreign policy decision-making studies 
is a perspective on and insight into the behavior of individuals. While 
it is a truism to point out that people make policy, and ,that individuals 
are biological and psychological beings, it is also nevertheless true that 
very little empirical political research has been done on the behavior 
of foreign policy elites as people in political decision-making situations. 
One obvious reason for this paucity is that the researcher seldom has 
the opportunity to observe real foreign policy decision-makers at work, 
particularly if they are operating in small, intimate groups. It is at this 
level that personal characteristics appear to be most important and 
weigh most heavily on the decisional process. 
Yet it is precisely this type of data which is most difficult to gen-
erate; and furthermore, even if we had a large body of data on which 
to draw, we seem to lack sufficient theoretical underpinnings to channel 
our observations into a coherent framework which would be meaning-
ful to foreign policy making analysts. 
On area which appears reasonably manageable from a research 
point of view involves the question of the influence of health and stress 
on the behavfor of individual decision-makers. Foreign policy elites not 
0 Sincere thanks to Richard H . Cady for his always perceptive comments. 
1 R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962); G. D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New 
York: The Free Press, 1968); and G. Allison, Essence of Decision: Expl,aining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little , Brown, 1971). 
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only are subjected to the normal and cumulative stresses of day-to-day 
decision-making , they are also peculiarly vulnerable to the intense 
stresses of an international crisis. 
WORK-STYLE AND ILLNESS 
What type of behavior is expected of elites who are acting in small 
decisional groups during , for example, international crisis? While this 
question cannot be definitively answered at this time , it seems reason-
able to assume that behavior which is consistent with Western admin-
istrative work-styles will emerge as the most desirable type of behavior. 
Salek Mine points out that an individual who displays a "high degree of 
occupation al leadership" in Western societies normally exhibits the fol-
lowing work-style characteristics: 
"I. He has a broad time perspective and strong orientation to the 
future. 
"2. He seems to be self-directed and self-disciplined. 
"3. He is detached from strong desires for immediate gratificati on. 
"4. He selects activities for potential achievements, not for the 
pleasure of work itself. 
"5. Although in every choice there must be an emotional element, 
once this choice is made, further emotional influences are sub-
ordinated to rationally patterned behavior. 
"6. He is reliable. When necessary, he drives himself to work 
through rational self-imposition. 
"7. He has a conscious awareness of responsibility and is rarely 
motivated by actual enthusiasm." 2 
The critical observation to be made about this list of work-style 
characteristics , as Mine emphasizes , is that it correlates very positively 
with a profile of the coronary-prone individual.3 That is, the "coronary 
candidate" monitors his own social behavior, suppresses his emotions, 
rigorously controls his drives and impulses , and is competitive and 
future oriented. Numerous studies have demonstrated this correlation.• 
2 S. Mine, "Civilized Pattern of Activity, Cardiac Adaptation, and Ischemic 
Heart Disease," in W. Raab, Prevention of Ischemic Heart Disease (Springfield, 
Illinois: Charl es A. Thomas, 1966) , pp. 156-162. 
8 Mine, ibid ., p . 157. 
4 See, for example, F. Dunbar , Psychosomatic Diagnosis (New York: P. B. Roe-
ber, Inc., 1943) ; N. N. Miles, S. Waldfogel , E. L. Barrobee, and S. Cobb, "Psycho-
somatic Study of 46 Young Men with Coronary Artery Disease," Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 16 (Nov ember-De cember, 1954); and S. E . Cleveland and D. L. Johnson, 
"Personality Patterns in Young Males with Coronary Disease," Psychosomatic Medi-
cine, 24 (November-December, 1962) . 
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The very nature of the Western administrative work-style, then, has a 
debilitating effect upon the health of elites who are subjected to the 
social pressures of the work-style. In order to conform to the requisite 
behavior, an individual could very likely create within himself those 
physiological conditions which might predispose him to coronary heart 
disease. 
TIIE EFFECTS OF SITUATIONAL STRESS 
Not only do the normal expectations of elite administrative behav-
ior, therefore, have an ennervating effect upon health, but the situational 
context can also contribute to the increase of stress upon an individual; 
and, indeed, decision-makers in international crisis situations are men 
often operating under the very debilitating conditions of high stress. 
Consequently, the study of stress may provide some powerful insights 
into the behavior of foreign-policy elites, as well as furnish clues as to 
bow substantive policy choices were influenced by human stress. 
As Lazarus has observed, the term "stress" always "conveys the idea 
that the person . . . is beset by powerful pressures which greatly tax the 
adaptive resources of the biological or psychological system." 6 From a 
homeostatic perspective, stress is always some type of stimulus condi-
tion that results in systemic disequilibrium. Central to this conceptuali-
zation is the understanding that the adaptive capabilities of an organism 
are interacting with a powerful set of stimuli from the environment. 
From a political point of view, the stimuli from the environment 
may be termed as events. A "stressful event" can be defined as "any 
charge in the environment which typically induces a high degree of emo-
tional tension and interferes with normal patterns of response." 6 More-
over, the stressfulness of an event can be enhanced when motivation to 
act is very strong. Thus, an international crisis can fit rather nicely into 
a stress framework by reconceptualizing crisis as a stimulus configura-
tion in the external political environment of a nation which induces a 
major degree of emotional tension in individual decision-makers who 
are highly motivated to respond to the demands of the stimulus. 
Mention should be made of a distinction that was first advanced 
by Hans Selye to clear up some possible terminological misunderstand-
ings. Selye preferred to designate the environmental stimulus situation 
as the stressor and the changed conditions in the organism as s,tress.7 
6 R. Lazarus , Psychological Stress and the Coping Process (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1966) , p. 10. 
6 I. L. Janis and H. Leventhal , "Human Reaction to Stress," in E. Borgatta and 
W. Lambert, Handbook of Personality Theory and Research ( Chicago: Rand Mc-
Nally, 1968), p. 1043. 
7 H. Selye, The Physiology and Pathowgy of Exposure to Stress ( Montreal: 
Acta, 1950) . 
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Furthermore, following Lazarus it is appropriate to refer to the adapta-
tion of the organism to its changed conditions as a stress reaction. Thus, 
an international crisis event can be conceptualized as a stressor which 
results in adaptive behavior on the part of individual decision-ma kers. 
Because the decision-makers are lawfully charged with the responsi-
bility of resolving the crisis, they can be termed as highly motivate d to 
act. The stressor then induces a condition of stress in the decision-maker. 
Reference should be made to the curvilinear relationship between 
the condition of stress and performance. It has been widely demon-
strated that low to moderate levels of stress facilitate cognitive efficiency 
but that when stress is increased to a very high level, efficiency is im-
paired; indiscriminate vigilance takes place; and poor judgment and 
avoidance behavior results. 8 Because of the difficulties of measureme nt, 
no attempt has ever been made to assess the impact of the levels of 
stress on the behavior of decision-makers while they are engaged in the 
resolution of international crises. While most of the evidence to support 
the curvilinear hypothesis on stress and performance has come from 
experimental research, very little work has been done utilizing real 
situations; and virtually nothing has been done in an international poli-
tical context. 
The one exception is Howard Lentner's study of the crisis manage-
ment machinery of the Department of State. 9 As part of bis resear ch 
Lentner administered a questionnaire to seventy-nine low to middle-
range Foreign Service Officers regarding their perceptions of the fre-
quency of psychological stress, anxiety, and tension that they observed 
or felt durin g an international crisis situation. Lentner's findings are 
quite clear: when asked whether a crisis heightens the sense of urge ncy 
which in tum produces increased stress, 85% responded in the "always" 
or "often" categories. Similarly, 75% agreed that a crisis always or often 
increases the tension among the participants who are involved in re-
solving it. But as Lentner himself points out, "the most important views 
of crisis are held by principal officers in government," and these were 
not the individuals who responded to the questionnaire. To put it dif-
ferently, the effects of stress may fall even more strongly on and are 
8 See, for example, I. L. Janis and S. Feshbach, "Effects of Fear Arousing 
Communications," Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 48 (January, 1953), pp. 
78-92; A. S. Luchins and E. H. Luchins, Rigidity of Behavior (Eugene: University 
of Oregon Books, 1959); E. Duffy, Activation and Behavior (New York: Wiley, 
1962); and I. L. Janis, Stress and Frustration (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovano-
vich, 1971). 
9 H. Lentner, "The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the United States Depart-
ment of State," in C. F. Hermann, International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral 
Research (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 112-133. 
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more critical to the key foreign policy actors who make rather than exe-
cute the decisions in crisis situations. 
In an attempt to get at the phenomenon of the key decision-makers 
themselves, Charles Hermann conceived of a very comprehensive simu-
lation study based upon the well-known Inter-Nation Simulation game 
prepared by Guetzkow and Cherryholmes. 10 When the participants in 
the simulation assumed that the game had been completed, the experi-
menters , in an effort to induce stress, arbitrarily extended the game in 
order to create deadlines for response. These deadlines put the par-
ticipants under time pressures to respond to the demands of the 
changed simulation situation. Though Hermann's work is exceedingly 
informative and insightful, and though Hermann himself is aware of 
the necessity, but virtually impossibility, of measuring real decision-
makers, it must be noted that his simulation data deals neither with 
political elites nor addresses itself to the question of real stress in which 
a human organism finds itself in jeopardy. These difficulties continue 
to confront political scientists who are involved in foreign policy deci-
sion-making studies. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Earlier in this article it was pointed out that theory-informed data 
on the influence of health and stress ought to be collected in order to 
gain some insights into the behavior of individual foreign policy deci-
sional elites. Physicians have frequently decried the lack of attention 
that political scientists devote to the study of the impaot of health vari-
ables on political behavior. For example, L'Etang examined the frag-
mentary medical biographies of -a handful of military and political 
leaders of World War II and concluded that illness played a major role 
in their decisional behavior. 11 Halberstam reflected on the medical re-
quirements for future occupants of the White House. 12 And Lee, focus-
ing on what he felt was the high incidence of insanity among heads of 
estate, called for stringent physical and psychological examinations. 18 
Yet a far more scientifically rigorous research effort is needed if we 
are to discover clear evidence of the influence of health on political 
elite behavior. One approach which deserves mention involves the com-
parative examination of the memoirs of statesmen. These works con-
10 C. F. Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy ( Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). 
11 H. L'Etang, The Pathology of Leadership (New York: Hawthorne, 1970). 
12 M. J. Halberstam, "Who's Medically Fit for the White House" New York 
Times Magazine ( October 22, 1972), p. 39ff. ' 
18 R. V. Lee, "When Insanity Holds the Scepter," New York Times (April 12, 
1974), p. 31. 
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tain a surprisingly rich body of information about health and illness. 
Interdisciplinary teams of physicians and political scientists ought to 
be able to develop insightful and imaginative coding schemes that will 
be useful in comparative analysis. Physicians who are employe d in large 
organizations such as the Department of State should be encourag ed to 
lend their experience and expertise to political scientists who are trying 
to interpret medical information in political autobiographies. 
Those who have intimately observed policy-making behavi or have 
long suspected that health and stress play a rather large role in deci-
sional policy choice. The task now is to demonstrate it scientifically. 
